Responding to mental health needs after terror attacks by Allsopp, K et al.
Item: BMJ-UK; Article ID: allk50533; 
Article Type: Analysis/RMR; TOC Heading: Analysis; DOI: 10.1136/bmj.l4828 
Page 1 of 9 
Responding to mental health needs after terror attacks 
Kate Allsopp,1 research associate, Chris R Brewin,2 emeritus professor of clinical 
psychology, Alan Barrett,3 4 consultant clinical psychologist, Richard Williams,5 emeritus 
professor of mental health strategy, Daniel Hind,6 reader in complex interventions, Prathiba 
Chitsabesan,7 8 consultant child and adolescent psychiatrist, Paul French,9 10 clinical 
researcher 
1 Complex Trauma and Resilience Research Unit, Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS 
Foundation Trust, Manchester Academic Health Science Centre, Manchester, UK 
2 University College London, London, UK 
3 Manchester Resilience Hub, Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust, Manchester, UK 
4 School of Health Sciences, University of Salford, Salford, UK 
5 Welsh Institute for Health and Social Care, University of South Wales, Pontypridd, UK 
6 School of Health and Related Research, Sheffield, UK 
7 Young People’s Mental Health Research Unit, Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust, 
Manchester, UK 
8 Division of Psychology and Mental Health, School of Health Sciences, University of 
Manchester, Manchester, UK 
9 Research and Innovation Department, Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust, Manchester, 
UK 
10 Faculty of Health, Psychology and Social Care, Manchester Metropolitan University, 
Manchester, UK 
Correspondence to: K Allsopp kate.allsopp1@nhs.net 
Provenance statement: Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed 
Serious problems identified after the 2005 London bombings still remain, argue Kate Allsopp 
and colleagues 
Mental health responses for people caught up in terror attacks are often inadequate. 
Internationally, existing services repeatedly fail to identify those with short and long term 
needs, resulting in an increased prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and 
anxiety disorders compared with the general population.1 Health services should plan for 
short and longer term psychosocial care and mental health treatment for the substantial 
minority who need interventions.2 But the UK has been slow to learn. Many shortcomings in 
the response to the 2005 London bombings remained at the time of the 2017 Manchester 
Arena bombing, despite proposals for a new approach. Here, we discuss how services have 
evolved since 2005 and what still needs to be done.  
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Planning a mental health response 
The demographics of the affected population are central to the design of any mental 
health response (box 1). The organisational challenges include specifying a responsible lead 
and chain of command; obtaining funding; providing reassurance, guidance, and messaging 
on trauma responses aimed at health services, other organisations, and the public; and 
identifying those affected and creating information handling arrangements that are flexible 
but compliant with data protection legislation. Coordination of a cross-agency response, 
involving health services, the third sector, and voluntary organisations is necessary to identify 
people who may develop mental health needs, arrange equitable access to evidence based 
care, and monitor use and outcomes. 
Box 1: Matching the mental health response to the population affected by mass casualty 
incidents 
● Localised versus dispersed populations. Dispersed populations require extensive efforts to 
identify people affected. The effects on geographically localised communities should be 
carefully considered; dispersed populations may form important virtual communities. 
● Demographic factors such as age and ethnicity may determine the agencies and groups that 
need to be involved in the response 
● The effect on exposed professional groups, including telephone operators and first 
responders, needs to be considered 
● Ongoing criminal, legal, and memorial processes may affect the course of recovery and 
create additional support needs 
London bombings, 2005 
In July 2005, terrorist attacks on London’s transport system caused 52 deaths and injured 
over 700 people. At this time, mental health was given little consideration in major incident 
plans, the expectation being that existing services would be able to manage additional 
demand. However, a capacity assessment showed that existing psychological trauma centres 
in London would not cope with a large influx of new patients.3 In August 2005, based on 
international findings that survivors were unlikely to have their mental health needs 
recognised unless they were contacted individually, Camden and Islington Mental Health and 
Social Care Trust and the London Development Centre for Mental Health sought funding for 
a screen and treat programme.4 Innovations included a centralised team that disseminated 
information about trauma responses, collated information about affected people, and 
identified those with related mental health difficulties through an outreach and screening 
programme. Individuals were screened for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other 
problems experienced since the attack, such as depression and phobia,3 with detailed 
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assessments for people with positive screening results leading to the option of referral for 
treatment. 
This programme confirmed that survivors with mental health problems were unlikely to 
be detected through conventional routes such as primary care. Access to specialist services 
was inconsistent; existing referral pathways and financial contracts acted as barriers. The 
project established that individuals did not mind being contacted through the screening 
programme, that treatment led to positive outcomes, and that a central team could facilitate 
equal access to treatment resources and monitor outcomes and costs.5 
However, lack of central planning led to unclear allocation of responsibility and absence 
of funding for the extra activity.3 The trust was obliged to operate at risk for most of the 
programme. There was a widespread failure to share data about affected people, even within 
the NHS, because of a belief that it would breach the Data Protection Act. As a consequence, 
we do not know how many people were affected by the incidents. 
International responses 
Mass violence incidents, including terror attacks, are a global problem. There is much 
potential for learning from responses in other countries. After the terror attacks in Oslo and 
Utøya Island in 2011, survivors, mainly young people, dispersed across the country. The 
Norwegian government approved a national primary care based outreach strategy coordinated 
by the Norwegian Centre for Violence and Traumatic Stress Studies, which used crisis teams 
in each affected municipality. Survivors were identified from a list of those attending a 
summer camp on the island.6 All were contacted directly after the attack and municipalities 
were recommended to assign each a contact person who would provide initial support, ensure 
continuity, and set up screening assessments. A follow-up study found that most (84%) had 
had communication with a contact person in the first four to five months, but this was not 
maintained; nearly half reported no communication between initial contact and 15 months 
after the attack.7 No contact was associated with lower use of mental health services, and 
20% of survivors who did not receive mental health services had clinically important mental 
distress.7 As the attack targeted young people, the response included family members in its 
outreach, finding they also had high levels of mental distress.6 Family outreach was less 
likely to have occurred if the parents were separated or not Norwegian.8 
France has had medicopsychological emergency teams (CUMPs) since 1995. These work 
alongside traditional emergency services providing immediate care for people affected by 
traumatic events. Research six months after the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, showed that 
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53.2% of civilian survivors received care from CUMPs within 48 hours. Those who had 
received CUMP support were less likely to experience anxiety or depression than people with 
no immediate contact.9 However, among civilians who received at least one psychiatric 
diagnosis, 70% and 30% of those indirectly and directly threatened, respectively, had 
received no mental health support.  
Supporting citizens affected by attacks while abroad presents further problems. England’s 
Department of Health set up a screen and treat programme for British survivors of the terror 
incidents in Tunisia, Paris, and Brussels in 2015-16.10 The programme started more than a 
year after the first attack, encountering considerable delay because of the lack of existing 
policies and practice, and was hampered by the unwillingness of commercial organisations 
and the police to share data on those affected. Of the 483 people identified, roughly 40% 
returned screening questionnaires to Public Health England, 92% of whom had at least one 
clinically relevant score, such as for PTSD symptoms. 
Manchester Arena, 2017 
In May 2017 a bomb was detonated as concertgoers were leaving an event at Manchester 
Arena. Twenty two members of the public plus the bomber were killed and over 350 were 
physically injured. Data access after the attack was problematic, but lists identifying some of 
those affected were shared between the concert promoter, NHS acute care sector, police, and 
voluntary and community organisations. A centralised outreach and screening service, the 
Manchester Resilience Hub, was fully operational within seven weeks, with financing 
underwritten by local commissioners until a national settlement was agreed. 
The service was based on the screen-and-treat design used after London 2005 and Tunisia 
2015 and informed by expertise from local military veteran services on responding to 
incidents involving improvised explosive devices. Based on patients’ feedback from earlier 
incidents, it focused on speed of response; the first people were contacted by telephone 
within 14 days. 
The hub carried out extensive consultation with schools, local services, and the media to 
share information about trauma responses. As over 80% of those affected live outside Greater 
Manchester, an online tool was used to support clinical triage; this enabled timely, large scale 
screening and facilitated regular follow-up. Questionnaires included the trauma screen 
questionnaire,11 generalised anxiety disorder assessment (GAD-7),12 patient health 
questionnaire (PHQ-9),13 work and social adjustment scale (WSAS),14 children’s impact of 
events scale (CRIES),15 and revised children’s anxiety and depression scale (RCADS).16 
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Standardised thresholds for clinical relevance were used to identify those in need of support, 
alongside risk criteria (suicidal ideation reported on PHQ-9; reporting no current 
psychological support). Many had clinically significant difficulties at initial registration: 55% 
of adults met criteria for possible PTSD, and up to 90% had anxiety; 25% of children and 
young people (8-18 years) had clinically significant depression scores; and 83% presented 
with possible PTSD. 
The hub’s main role is to give remote support and refer clients to their local services for 
psychological therapies recommended by the National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence.17 It also conducts some face-to-face assessments for families with complex needs 
and a limited amount of direct therapy. Therapy is usually provided by existing regional NHS 
mental health services, but the hub received some charitable donations to fund private 
therapy for children and young people when NHS services were unavailable or there were 
unreasonable waiting times. Regional access to specialist trauma focused interventions has 
been highly variable, particularly for children and young people. 
The hub also runs supportive workshop days for families in response to feedback asking 
for more contact with other affected people. So far, there have been 12 across the country, 
attended by 485 people (149 of them under 16). 
An estimated 15 000 people were at the arena on the night of the attack. But after two 
years only around 3500 people had registered with the hub, just under a quarter of those 
present. There may be many more affected people who have not registered. Since there was 
no centralised register, a list of people was derived from concert ticket sales, police, and the 
NHS, but this did not include everyone present or potentially affected. 
Where are we now? 
Fourteen years after the London bombings, awareness of mental health needs after 
terrorist attacks has greatly improved and more detailed clinical plans now exist. The 
Department of Health and regional offices of NHS England have provided clear leadership on 
the response to attacks. Although formal evidence on how to respond is lacking, messaging 
targeted at the public coupled with centralised outreach, screening, and monitoring of those 
affected are accepted as appropriate to prevent untreated morbidity and ensure equality of 
access to treatment. 
Obstacles remain to an effective response. Mental health services are still rarely included 
in planning exercises for UK emergency responses, and there are no pre-agreed funding 
mechanisms to support the extra administrative, outreach, and treatment costs of 
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emergencies. The need to seek funds creates additional workload, reduces efficiency, and 
introduces uncertainty at a time when extra staff and careful future planning are needed. 
Local trusts should not have to operate at financial risk by providing services before national 
funding is agreed. Commissioning arrangements should recognise that incidents may require 
a coordinated national response. However, it is not clear who is responsible for resolving 
these problems or whether anyone is considering them. 
Data sharing barriers within and across organisations continue to impede the 
identification and clinical management of affected people, despite only a small minority of 
the public objecting in principle to data sharing.18 In 2007, non-statutory guidance from the 
Cabinet Office19 clarified that it was legal to share personal information that was in the 
individual’s interest, but organisations, including the NHS, remain cautious. For example, in 
Manchester, emergency services opted to inform staff of available support rather than share 
staff contact details with the hub. Action from the Information Commissioner’s Office, or 
even legislation, may be needed to overcome entrenched practices and ensure that the 2018 
EU General Data Protection Regulation does not further impede care for survivors. 
We think a central mechanism to initiate a health register after an incident is crucially 
important. It is a practical way of bringing together personal data from different organisations 
such as the police, health services, and commercial organisations, as well as permitting self 
registration, however dispersed the survivors. Such a register would facilitate subsequent 
outreach attempts using mobile phones and email. In France, a voluntary register was 
successfully trialled for French nationals involved in several major disasters.20 A limited 
physical health register was adopted after the 2005 London bombings.21 Public Health 
England started work on a health register protocol for major incidents in 201222 but this has 
not been completed for unknown reasons. 
What next? 
Although the number of people experiencing mental health effects after major incidents is 
often greater than the number with physical injuries, and the effects can last much longer, 
mental health has attracted much less in the way of planning and resources. Clinical 
understanding about how to support and treat survivors of major incidents is reasonably 
advanced.23 24 However, care is often not being delivered adequately because of 
organisational and institutional failings. Box 2 sets out our recommendations to improve the 
UK response. The problem, however, is international, with much wider appreciation needed 
of the importance of active outreach.  
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Box 2: Actions to improve mental health response to mass casualty incidents 
● Update policy and guidance on designing, planning, and delivering psychosocial and 
mental healthcare after incidents and integrate this into pre-incident planning and 
exercises of all responsible authorities, including schools and colleges 
● Identify funding in advance and establish agreements in principle with commissioners to 
enable local services to activate plans quickly and provide services for sufficient periods  
● Revisit the requirements and regulations for effective information sharing across agencies 
with robust mechanisms agreed in advance to ensure data sharing is frictionless and 
timely 
● Complete and implement plans for a health register to detect as many of those affected as 
possible and ensure the effective delivery of care 
 
Key messages 
● People experiencing terrorism and mass casualty incidents have high levels of untreated 
psychological morbidity  
● Active outreach is often essential to identify all those affected by an event, whether the 
affected population is local or geographically widespread  
● Lack of clarity around financial arrangements and data sharing are impeding mental health 
responses 
● Mental healthcare for adults and children should be incorporated into all advance planning 
for response to mass casualty incidents 
● A central register of survivors is needed to ensure everyone has access to support 
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